Читаем Tank Rider: Into the Reich with the Red Army полностью

Going on a scout mission in daytime in the open field, sinking in a muddy ploughed field, where bushes did not have leaves and wheat was not high, was a hard task. It was practically a suicide mission – Germans could merely shoot us down in the field or try to take us prisoners. Even without a reconnaissance we knew that the Germans occupied the village in front of us the day before – day and night we heard noise of the tank and truck engines from the village. But I had my orders and I had to fulfil them, as I did not receive any counterorders. I took two or three physically strong soldiers, and my binoculars, and off we went. It was fortunate that there was a ravine and we advanced 1 or 1.5 kilometres in it. It was a hard walk in the ravine, we could barely pull our feet out from the mud; we reached a hill, lay down on a dry spot and started to examine the surrounding area. Inspecting the terrain through the binoculars, I noticed a column of trucks and APCs advancing on the road to the right of us towards our defences, a little bit to the right of the battalion. To the left of us, less than a kilometre distant on the neighbouring hill, we spotted an armoured personnel carrier and several trucks, apparently carrying infantry. The Germans slowly advanced towards our village. It did not make any sense to stay there any longer and we went back secretly to our lines. At one place we had to abandon the ravine and we were in the sight of the Germans that marched to the left of us on the top of the hill. However, they did not open fire, although they could easily have cut us all down from the APC, even more so when a Tiger tank joined them later. We could not run – we did not have any energy left. Even now I do not understand, why they did not kill us, when we barely dragged our feet across the ploughed field in some 250 to 300 metres from them.

Upon my return I reported to Belan what I had seen and pointed at the German unit that was some 300 metres from our line of defence. The Germans quietly stood there, without opening fire. Captain Belan did not say anything, but it seemed to me that he was upset about something. But what? With me coming back alive with all soldiers? But we did make it back, and Captain Belan reported to the Brigade HQ about the large column of German troops that moved to the right from our battalion and a small group of Germans to the left of us. Captain Belan went off to the battalion HQ to the other side of the river, taking Chernyshov with him, ordering me to stay in the trenches with the untrained soldiers on the western bank of the river.

On the same day, late in the afternoon, Katyushas fired a salvo. It was good that we were in our foxholes, because when the Katyusha missiles started to explode to the right of the company and then closer to us, we were all able hide in them. Several missiles exploded on the company’s positions, but no one was hurt. When this nightmare was over and I peeped out from my foxhole, and saw a large piece of a missile that had not exploded lying just outside. The entire salvo had hit an empty spot and us, but they should have been firing on the neighbouring hill, where Germans were digging in – the Germans that I had fled from.

How can one explain this mistake in firing the salvo? Only by the fact that someone, apparently Belan, gave the wrong co-ordinates, confused two hills, or maybe just did not know how to read the map. The salvo could easily have knocked out the whole company, as at Skalat, when the 2nd and 3rd battalions suffered significant losses from Katyusha fire. The battalion HQ requested the results of the Katyusha salvo over the ’phone. I informed them that the salvo had hit an empty spot and the company, but no losses were inflicted and they should have shifted fire to the left. However, the Katyushas did not fire any more. Some time after the fire mission my soldiers reported to me that engineers wanted to blow up the only bridge across the river. The engineers confirmed that they had had such an order, while the battalion informed me over the ’phone that I was not to prevent them from blowing up the bridge. They also informed me that all communication with me was discontinued and that the ’phone operators were to leave me together with their ’phone and cable.

I was outraged, but they told me: ‘It is necessary’. I thought ‘Well, to hell with you all’, but was more precise in my description of the commanders, using some obscene words. In general, our company officers only used such obscenities in extreme cases, if ever. We did not curse in vain and did not use such words to get the soldiers up to attack. I walked up to the engineers and asked their senior to blow up only the part that touched the western bank, approximately half the bridge, leaving the eastern part intact just in case. The engineers took heed of my request and did everything as I asked them.

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